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Abstract—The rapid evolution of mobile radio network tech-
nologies poses severe technical and economical challenges to
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs); on the economical side, the
continuous roll-out of technology updates is highly expensive,
which may lead to the extreme where offering advanced mobile
services becomes no longer affordable for MNOs which thus are
not incentivized to innovate. Mobile infrastructure sharing among
MNOs becomes then an important building block to lower the
required per-MNO investment cost involved in the technology
roll-out and management phases.
We focus on a Radio Access Network (RAN) sharing situation
where multiple MNOs with a consolidated network infrastructure
coexist in a given set of geographical areas; the MNOs have then
to decide if it is profitable to upgrade their RAN technology by
deploying additional small-cell base stations and whether to share
the investment (and the deployed infrastructure) of the new small-
cells with other operators. We address such strategic problem by
giving a mathematical framework for the RAN infrastructure
sharing problem which returns the “best” infrastructure sharing
strategies for operators (coalitions and network configuration)
when varying techno-economic parameters such as the achievable
throughput in different sharing configurations and the pricing
models for the service offered to the users. The proposed
formulation is then leveraged to analyze the impact of the
aforementioned parameters/input in a realistic mobile network
environment based on LTE technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
MOBILE telecommunication networks and services havebeen characterized by a dramatic uptake in the past
two decades which is still to be over. According to [1], the
penetration of mobile subscriptions has reached the amazing
level of 96% worldwide in 2014, and the traffic delivered
through mobile radio networks is expected to reach 11.2
Exabytes/month by 2017 [2] with a considerable share taken
by bandwidth-eager services provided by aggressive Over The
Top service providers.
To cope with such fast growing rate, the mobile networks
have undergone, and are still undergoing, several technology
migration phases cruising from the introduction of third gen-
eration (3G) and 3.5G wireless technologies on top of 2G
networks to the standardization and deployment of the Long
Term Evolution (LTE) with the recent launch of 5G initiatives
[3]. The effect of such rapid evolution in the mobile networks
technologies poses several technical and economical chal-
lenges to Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). On the technical
side, the coexistence of multiple technologies in the Radio
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Access Network (RAN) calls for advanced radio resource
orchestration procedures to cope with such heterogeneity. On
the economical side, the combined effect of revenues of MNOs
that tend to flatten and the network technology updates that
are highly expensive may lead to the extreme where offering
advanced mobile services becomes no longer affordable for
MNOs which are not incentivized to innovate and migrate to
new technologies [4].
In this context, the conventional model according to which
each MNO retains complete control and ownership of its
network is at odds with the large and frequent investments
requested on the network infrastructure, and with the increased
complexity in the management of the network components.
Mobile infrastructure sharing among MNOs thus becomes an
important building block to “break” such vertical and inflexible
approach, by lowering the required per-MNO investment cost
to cope in the technology roll-out and management phases.
Different forms of infrastructure sharing are already in
place, ranging from basic unbundling and roaming, to site and
spectrum sharing [5]. In these “classical” forms of sharing gen-
erally one MNO still retains ownership of the mobile network.
On the other hand, we focus here on a RAN sharing scheme
in which MNOs share a single radio infrastructure while
maintaining separation and full control over the back hauling
and respective core networks. In this work, we consider a
scenario where multiple MNOs with a consolidated macro
cells network infrastructure and consolidated market shares
coexist in a given set of geographical areas; the MNOs have
to decide if it is profitable to upgrade their RAN technology
by deploying additional small-cell base stations and whether
to share the investment (and the deployed infrastructure) of
the new small-cells with other operators.
We address such strategic problem by providing a mathe-
matical framework for the analysis of the RAN infrastructure
sharing problem that takes into account both technical and
economical aspects and provides the optimal sharing strategies
for MNOs, that include coalitions with other MNOs and
network configuration. The proposed infrastructure sharing
problem is first tackled from the perspective of a regulatory
entity that can impose sharing configurations maximizing the
quality of service perceived by all users and then from a
single MNO perspective, in order to account for MNOs as
profit-maximizing selfish entities. A Mixed Integer Linear
Programming (MILP) formulation is proposed to determine
sharing configurations maximizing the quality of service; this
formulation includes techno-economic parameters such as the
achievable throughput and the pricing models for the service
offered to the users. For representing the MNO perspective,
2we propose a Non Transferable Utility (NTU) coalitional
game model. The proposed mathematical framework is then
leveraged to analyze the impact of the aforementioned pa-
rameters in a realistic mobile network environment based on
LTE technology for which numerical values for technical and
economic parameters are available. Note however that the
proposed approach is general and can be easily applied to
other scenarios with different small cell technologies.
The manuscript is organized as follows: Sec. II reviews
the mainstream literature in the field of infrastructure sharing
highlighting the main novelties of the proposed approach.
In Sec. III, we introduce the reference scenario describing
the techno-economic parameters involved in the infrastructure
sharing problem and the proposed mathematical framework
that allows to represent the problem from the two considered
perspectives. Sec. IV describes the considered scenarios and
cases while results and insights are reported in Sec. V, where
the strategic behavior of MNOs in several different realistic
scenarios is analyzed. Our concluding remarks are given in
Sec. VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The literature on infrastructure/resource sharing can be
grouped in two main research tracks: (i) works dealing with
techno-economic modeling of network sharing and (ii) works
on practical algorithms for management and allocation of
shared network resources. The first track mostly includes qual-
itative and quantitative studies of different sharing scenarios
and models for estimating capital and operational expendi-
tures. Particular attention is dedicated to the identification
of drivers and barriers to network sharing or possible new
organization of the mobile network value chain for sharing to
be viable.
Meddour et al. [6] suggest guidelines for MNO involved in
the sharing process and emphasize the need for subsidization
and assistance from regulatory entities. Similarly, Beckman
et. al [7] show that the role of regulatory entities is crucial to
avoid the decline of market competition.
A recent work by Di Francesco et al. [8] introduces a
competition-aware network sharing framework in the context
of cellular network planning which allows to balance the
cost benefit of sharing and the push toward next-generation
technologies.
The authors of [9] model the capital and operational expen-
ditures for different levels of sharing and suggest outsourcing
as the solution to the challenges posed by network sharing.
In [10], the authors propose a benchmark-based model that
provides high-quality cost estimates for alternative delivery
options of the MNO processes such as “regionalization”,
“centralization” and “outsourcing”. Vaz et al. propose a frame-
work to evaluate the performance of heterogeneous network
deployment patterns in terms of net present value, capacity,
coverage, and carbon footprint [11]. By means of a techno-
economic analysis, the work in [12] addresses the cost/revenue
viability of different WLAN value network configurations in
the presence of MNOs and Service Application Providers and
the use cases for which there is incentive to share.
In the field of strategic modeling of resource/infrastructure
sharing, it is worth mentioning the works resorting to game
theory. Malanchini et al. [13] resort to non-cooperative games
to model the problems of network selection, when users can
choose among multiple heterogeneous wireless access, and
of resource allocation in which mobile network operators
compete to capture users by properly allocating their radio
resources. In [14], spectrum sharing among selfish MNOs in
unlicensed bands is modeled as a non-cooperative game. The
work in [15] and more extensively in [16] also use a non-
cooperative game to model the strategic decision of a MNO
regarding sharing its LTE infrastructure in a non–monopolistic
telecom market. Another example of 4G infrastructure sharing
is given in [17] which considers sharing LTE access net-
work femtocells with other access technologies such as Wi–
Fi. Cooperative game theory is used in [18] and [19]; in
[18], the resource allocation problem in a shared network is
formalized in a two step problem: resource sharing among
the operators and resource bargaining among the users and
Mobile Virtual Network Operators of each operator; the work
in [19] considers not only sharing among MNOs but also
among operators of different wireless access technologies.
The research track on practical aspect of
resource/infrastructure sharing focuses on algorithms and
architectures for managing shared resources. The work in
[20] suggests that radio resource management is handled by
a third-party service provider or an inter-connection provider
to preserve competition and reduce exposure. Anchora et
al. ([21]) introduce a ns-3 implementation to assess the
performance of spectrum sharing in a LTE multi-node/multi-
MNO scenario, where a virtual central entity is responsible
for applying the sharing policies to the common frequency
pool. In [22], virtualization of the wireless medium (spectrum
sharing) is proposed to exploit spectrum multiplexing and
multi-user diversity while allowing MNOs to remain isolated.
Instead, the authors in [23] introduce the Network without
Borders concept as a pool of virtualized wireless resources
with a shared radio resource manager. Along the same lines,
Rahman et al. ([24]) introduce a novel architecture based
on wireless access network virtualization, where the key
tenet is to offload the baseband process from physical base
station to backend devices; in this way, the physical base
stations can be sliced into virtual base stations. In [25],
instead, a 2-level radio resource scheduling (among MNOs
and for each MNO among its user flows) BS virtualization
scheme satisfying the 3GPP SA1 RSE ([26]) requirements
has been proposed. The work in [27] proposes the necessary
LTE architectural enhancements to adopt capacity, spectrum
and hardware sharing, and provides a simulation-based
comparative performance analysis of the proposed sharing
scenarios and of no sharing case. Johansson [28] provides
an algorithm for fair allocation of the shared radio resource
among multiple operators.
The aforementioned literature work either abstracts away
technical aspects related to the mobile network performance
to focus on more economic-oriented analysis and modeling,
or the other way around. In our previous work [29], we
focus on infrastructure sharing in a single and homogeneous
3geographical area. To the best of our knowledge, ours is
one of the first attempts to strike a better balance between
these two aspects of the sharing problem, by quantitatively
modeling the relation between technical issues related to the
radio communication at the access interface (area coverage,
transmission rate, user density and quality observed by users)
with economic issues (deployment costs and revenues) in
mobile network infrastructure sharing. In this work we provide
a more general framework which captures large-scale sharing
scenarios featuring multiple geographical areas. Further, we
consider two different perspectives: the single decision maker
one, where the decision maker is a regulatory authority, and
the multiple decision makers perspective, that accounts for the
single MNO point of view.
III. MODELING THE PROBLEM OF MOBILE NETWORK
INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING
We decided to explore two alternative infrastructure sharing
configurations: socially optimal configurations providing the
best service level for the users, which can be imposed by a
regulatory authority1 and stable configurations representing a
setting where MNOs act as selfish entities aiming to maximize
their profits from upgrading their network. While a centralized
approach allows to model the problem of determining so-
cially optimal configurations, cooperative game theory is more
suitable to determine stable configurations. In Section III-A,
we introduce the techno-economic parameters representing the
considered scenario and provide an MILP formulation for
the centralized approach. In Section III-B, we discuss how
an NTU cooperative game is adopted to determine stable
configurations. We remark that in Sections III-A and III-B, we
use the term coalition with a slight abuse of terminology to
represent a set of MNOs which build a unique shared network,
both when they decide to join the coalition based on their
profit and when the coalition is suggested as a socially optimal
choice. In III-A, the socially optimal coalitional structure
(partition of the set of MNOs) is selected according to the
regulator point of view and each MNO is assigned to its
corresponding coalition. Instead, in III-B, each MNO joins the
coalition that maximizes its individual profit; in other words, a
coalition is stable when none of its members has an incentive
to leave the coalition.
A. Socially optimal coalitional structures - an MILP formula-
tion
We consider a set O of MNOs who have up and running
3G/4G networks over a set A of dense urban areas: each area
a ∈ A is populated by Na users and has a size Aa. Parameter
σi gives the share of users of MNO i ∈ O which is assumed
to be equal in each area. The MNOs may consider investing
to deploy additional LTE small-cells (HetNets) in some or all
the areas. A MNO can either invest by itself or share the
investment (and the deployed infrastructure) with a subset (or
1It is usually the case that infrastructure sharing agreements are analyzed
on a per-case basis by a regulatory authority aiming to assess the impact of
such sharing agreements on the users; at the limit, regulators could impose
configurations that provide the best service level for the users.
all) of the other MNOs. Let S denote the set of all possible
coalitions that can be activated for the given set of MNOs
(here we consider all possible non-empty subsets, thus |S| is
equal to 2|O| − 1). If a MNO invests by itself, the coalition
is referred to as singleton. Si is the set of coalitions MNO i
can be part of. Each MNO inherits the customer base from
its current network, assuming that users do not change their
MNO but may subscribe to a new (LTE) data plan.
We consider the problem of determining the socially optimal
sharing configurations, that is, how to partition MNOs in
coalitions and how many small-cell base stations (BSs) each
coalition of MNOs should activate in order to maximize the
global service level provided to the users.
In each area a maximum number Umax of BSs can be
activated by all coalitions.
Users are characterized by parameter δ that represents their
willingness to pay for 1 Mbps of LTE rate on a monthly basis
and therefore the monthly price of 1 Mbps.
We consider an investment lifetime D (in months). The
investment costs are then calculated over the whole D period.
Both capital (e.g., site and BS acquisition) and operational
(e.g., hardware and software maintenance, land renting and
power supply) expenditures contribute to the overall costs of
the infrastructure [6].
Let gcapex and gαopex denote the fixed CAPEX and annual
OPEX components, respectively. gαopex is calculated as a fixed
percentage (ξ) of gcapex, i.e., gαopex = ξgcapex. We denote by
g the cost of a single BS for the investment lifetime D which
is determined as the sum of the fixed initial CAPEX and the
OPEX accumulated during D, i.e.,
g = gcapex +
1
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Dgαopex. (1)
The BSs installation cost of a coalition is then divided among
the coalition members based on their market shares.
We assume that the same coalitional structure will apply to
all areas, that is, MNOs will be assigned to the same coalition
in all areas, as it can be easier for MNOs to coordinate with
the same set of MNOs in all the areas2. Table I recaps the
problem’s parameters notation.
The partitioning of the set of MNOs O into a socially
optimal coalitional structure is modeled as follows. Binary
variables ys represent the coalition activation: ys equals one
if coalition s is activated in all the areas a ∈ A and it invests
(deploys BSs) in at least one of them. The binary variable xis
is equal to one if MNO i is assigned to coalition s ∈ Si and
s invests, it equals zero if i is assigned to any other coalition
in Si but s or s does not invest. Constraints (2) guarantee that
each MNO i is assigned to at most one coalition from Si.
Constraints (3) make sure that if s is activated (ys = 1), all
2In the case of stable sharing configurations, as MNOs decide by themselves
which coalition to join, selecting the same coalition (set of collaborating
MNOs) in all the areas might also require less time for the sharing agreements
to be approved by regulators. Nevertheless, we have also investigated the case
in which MNOs are assigned/select a different coalition in each area, which
overall does not provide significant gains with respect to forcing the same
one over all areas.
4MNOs i ∈ s are assigned to s.∑
s∈Si
xis ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ O, (2)
xis = ys, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ s. (3)
If coalition s is activated, it will deploy a certain number of
BSs for each area a ∈ A, represented by a non-negative integer
variable uas . If s is not activated or there is no investment
(ys = 0), the corresponding variables uas , for each a ∈ A,
are forced to zero by means of Constraints (4). Conversely, a
coalition is not active (ys = 0) if it does not deploy any BS
in any of the areas (Constraint (5)); Constraint (6) limits the
overall number of BSs deployed by all coalitions in each area.
uas ≤ Umaxys, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (4)
ys ≤
∑
a∈A
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, (5)∑
s∈S
uas ≤ Umax, ∀ a ∈ A. (6)
We assess the quality of service provided by MNOs through
the average rate perceived by the users, which is an important
indicator of the users’ level of satisfaction. This rate is different
for each area a ∈ A: firstly because we consider areas with
different number of users (Na) and size (Aa) and secondly
because a different number of BSs (uas ) may be deployed in
different areas. In the proposed model, we define two types of
LTE user rate, namely nominal and average, for each coalition
s ∈ S . The nominal user rate is the maximum achievable
LTE rate for a certain level of Signal to Interference and
Noise Ratio (SINR) and a given system bandwidth3 that a user
perceives when assigned all downlink LTE resource blocks
from its serving BS. The downlink SINR depends on the
number of BSs activated by the coalition the user belongs
to since a larger number of BSs results in the user being
on the average closer to its serving BS, and thus receiving a
stronger signal, but also closer to the interfering BSs4. Thus,
the nominal user rate of coalition s in area a, represented by
a non-negative continuous variable ρa,noms , is a function of
the number of deployed BSs uas . The behavior of ρ
a,nom
s as
a function of uas is investigated by simulating the deployment
of the small cell BSs (see Subsec. IV-A).
Instead, the average user rate perceived by a user of coalition
s in area a is represented by the continuous non-negative
variables ρas and defined in terms of the nominal user rate
(ρa,noms ) and of the load of its serving BS as follows
5:
ρas = ρ
a,nom
s (1− η)
∑
i∈s σiNa
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A,
where parameter η is the user activity factor, that is, the
probability that a user is actually active in his/her serving BS,∑
i∈s σiNa is the total number of users that are served by
members of coalition s in area a, and the ratio
∑
i∈s σiNa
uas
is
3We consider a 10 Mhz bandwidth in our simulations whether the BS is
shared or not.
4Since we are considering a nominal rate, any other BS transmission will
use a subset or all the resource blocks and therefore unavoidably interfere.
5We note that this equation is defined for uas > 0, while we set ρ
a
s = 0
when uas = 0.
the average number of users served by one BS in area a. As
a result, ρa,noms is scaled down by the factor (1− η)
∑
i∈s σiNa
uas
which accounts for the average congestion level at a serving
BS in a.
In the MILP formulation, the nonlinearity of ρas in terms
of uas is handled by approximating ρ
a
s with a piecewise linear
function described by the following constraints:
zas ≤ uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (7)
ρas ≤ Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls ) +M(1− zas ), (8)
∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ l ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1},
ρas ≤ Ra,Ls zas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, (9)
where zas are binary variables that equal 0 if u
a
s = 0
(Constraints (7)) and therefore set to zero ρas when u
a
s = 0
(Constraints (9)). Constraints (8) model the piecewise linear
functions approximating ρas , for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A, where
L denotes the number of the linear pieces, αa,ls denotes the
slope of the l-th linear piece, Ua,ls and R
a,l
s are the coordinates
(number of BSs and user rate, respectively) of the (l + 1)
breakpoint whereas M is a big positive constant (see Appendix
A for the details of the approximation).
Assuming that, in each area a, users of any member of
coalition s can be served by any of the BSs activated by s
in a, the average user rate provided by MNO i in area a,
represented by continuous non-negative variable qai , is equal
to the average user rate of the coalition to which i is assigned,
that is,
qai =
∑
s∈Si
ρas , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (10)
As for the investment cost and revenues for the MNOs, it
is reasonable to model the revenue6 per MNO i in area a
as a continuous non-negative variable rai which is linearly
dependent on the MNO’s user rate qai in that area as shown
in (11): δqai is the monthly revenue obtained from one user,
which is then multiplied by the investment lifetime D and the
number of users σiNa of MNO i in area a:
rai = δDσiNaq
a
i , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (11)
The cost incurred by MNO i in area a, represented by non-
negative continuous variable cai , is a linear function of the
number of BSs activated in a by the coalition to which i is
assigned, divided among the coalition’s members proportion-
ally to their number of users:
cai =
∑
s∈Si
g
σi∑
j∈s
σj
uas , ∀ i ∈ O, ∀ a ∈ A. (12)
6The price per unit of service (δ) represents the highest price all current
users of each MNO are willing to pay for the new service. Therefore the
number of users N is assumed independent of δ. Moreover, the proposed
pricing model aims at translating the MNOs level of investment, which affects
the service level perceived by users, into revenues. It is outside of the scope of
the analysis we propose here to account for pricing models in line with those
currently applied by MNOs which involve bundles of services, data caps etc.
In the same lines, we do not account for the user migration among MNOs
since it is generally determined by “non-technical” parameters such as special
tariffs, bundle offers, brand fidelity and more in general marketing strategies.
5Although the socially optimal infrastructure sharing config-
urations provide the optimal service level for users, MNOs
cannot be forced to undertake lossy investments. Therefore,
Constraints (13) make sure that each MNO obtains a non-
negative profit:∑
a∈A
(rai − cai ) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ O. (13)
We consider two candidate objective functions to be maxi-
mized to determine the socially optimal sharing configurations:∑
i∈O,a∈A
qai , (14a)
min
i∈O,a∈A
qai . (14b)
Objective (14a) favors efficiency by maximizing the sum of
user rate over all MNOs and areas, whereas (14b) maximizes
the smallest user rate (over all areas and MNOs), so as to
privilege users’ fairness. We denote Objectives (14a) and (14b)
by TOTQ and MINQ, respectively and use this notation
throughout Section V. Sets and parameters describing the
instances are recapped in Table I whereas variables in Table
II. In Appendix B, we prove that the decision version of the
problem with objective MINQ is NP-complete.
Symbol Description Value
O Set of MNOs {A,B,C}, |O|=3
A Set of Areas {Z1,Z2,Z3}
S Set of coalitions {A,B,C,AB,AC,BC,ABC}
Si Set of coalitions MNO i∈O can join {s∈S|i∈s}
Na Number of users of area a∈A See Table III
Aa Size of area a∈A See Table III
σi Market share of MNO i∈O M1:{1/3,1/3,1/3}, M2:{0.1,0.3,0.6}
Umax Max. number of BSs in the area 4000
δ Monthly price of 1 Mbps Equidistant values in [0.02,2]e/Mbps
D Investment lifetime [months] 120 ([30],[28])
η User activity factor 0.001
ξ OPEX annual % 15% [31]
gcapex CAPEX of BS cost 3000e
g BS cost normalized for D 7500e
TABLE I: Sets, parameters, and corresponding values
Variable Description
xis∈{0, 1} 1 if MNO i∈O joins coalition s∈Si in all areas, 0 otherwise
ys∈{0, 1} 1 if coalition s∈S is created in all areas, 0 otherwise
uas∈Z+ Number of BSs activated by coalition s∈S in area a∈A
zas∈{0, 1} 1 if coalition s∈S activates at least one BS in area a∈A, 0 otherwise
ρa,noms ≥0 Nominal user rate for coalition s∈S in area a∈A
ρas≥0 User rate for coalition s∈S in area a∈A
qai ≥0 User rate for MNO i∈O in area a∈A
cai≥0 Costs of MNO i∈O in area a∈A
rai ≥0 Revenues of MNO i∈O in area a∈A
TABLE II: Variable domains and description
B. Stable coalitional structures - A non transferable utility
cooperative game model
We now describe the problem of determining stable infras-
tructure sharing configurations. We assume that MNOs in a
coalition will share their cost while each MNO will keep its
individual revenue since the latter is incurred from its own
share of users. As a result, the coalition worth, that is, the
difference between the coalition global revenues and cost,
cannot be redistributed among its members: therefore we adopt
solution concepts of NTU cooperative games [32].
The game is formalized as a pair (O, V ), where the player
set O coincides with the set of MNOs and V is a function
that associates to each non-empty coalition s ∈ S a subset of
payoff allocation vectors (pii)i∈O, i.e.,
V (s) = {(pii)i∈O : pii ≤ pis ∀ i ∈ s},
where pis is the optimal payoff of player i in coalition s.
Since each MNO is a self-interested entity that aims to
maximize its individual profits from the investment, we define
its optimal payoff pis from a given coalition as the largest
profit (difference between total revenues and total cost) it can
achieve if it becomes part of that coalition. Such payoffs are
calculated in the following fashion: given a coalition s ∈ S ,
we determine the optimal number of BSs (u˜as ) activated in
each area a ∈ A, calculate each member’s revenues and costs
for each area and therefore calculate the MNO total profit.
The optimal number u˜as of BSs coalition s can deploy in
area a is obtained solving the following problem7:
max
∑
i∈s
rai − cai (15)
rai = δDσiNaρ
a
s , ∀ i ∈ s, (16)
cai =
σi∑
j∈s
σj
guas , ∀ i ∈ s, (17)
uas ≤ Umax, (18)
zas ≤ uas , (19)
ρas ≤ Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls ) +M(1− zas ), (20)
∀ l ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1},
ρas ≤ Ra,Ls zas , (21)
uas ∈ Z+, ρas ≥ 0, zas ∈ {0, 1}. (22)
The objective function (15) can be rewritten as
∑
i∈s
δDσiNaρas − σi∑
j∈s
σj
guas
 = (23)
(∑
i∈s
σi
) δDNaρas − 1∑
j∈s
σj
guas
 ,
where ρas depends on u
a
s . As δDNaρ
a
s − 1∑
j∈s σj
guas is
independent of the MNOs, the optimal number u˜as of BSs
is the same for all the players and can be easily computed
solving the above problem.
7We remark that, in the problem we upper bound the number of BSs
activated by each coalition in the area to Umax (Constraint (18)) since, for
the considered instances (see Section V), the total number of BSs activated
by any partition of MNOs in the set O does not exceed Umax, that is, the
more stringent Constraint (6) which limits the number of BSs activated by all
coalitions in the area to Umax is never tight.
6Therefore, the optimal payoff pis of each MNO i ∈ s is
pis =
∑
a∈A
δDσiNaρas(u˜as)− σi∑
j∈s
σj
gu˜as
 = (24)
σi∑
j∈s σj
∑
a∈A
δDNaρas(u˜as)∑
j∈s
σj − gu˜as
 .
In other words, the optimal payoff allocations pis corre-
spond to dividing the optimal worth of coalition s, i.e.,∑
a∈A
(
δDNaρ
a
s(u˜
a
s)
∑
j∈s σj − gu˜as
)
, among its members
according to their relative market shares, i.e., σi/
∑
j∈s σj .
In the following we look for stable infrastructure sharing
configurations. We define a sharing configuration as a partition
(s1, . . . , sp) of the MNOs set O, where coalitions s1, . . . , sp ∈
S. A configuration (s1, . . . , sp) is said stable if for any j =
1, . . . , p there is no nonempty subset s′j ⊂ sj such that
pis′j > p
i
sj , ∀ i ∈ s′j ,
that is, for any coalition sj no subset of MNOs has incentive
to leave it.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
We run several tests to evaluate how the coalitional struc-
ture, the level of investment, and therefore the performance
indicators of both the socially optimal and stable configura-
tions are affected by the user economic standpoint.
The MILP model (Section III-A) and problem (15)–(22) for
any s ∈ S and a ∈ A (Section III-B) have been implemented
in AMPL [33]. We have used Gurobi 6.0 [34] as a MILP
solver. All tests were run on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M
CPU @2.6 Ghz. To keep the computational time limited,
for some of the instances the acceptable relative MIP gap
of Gurobi was set equal to 1e-6. When optimizing MINQ,
several equivalent optimal solutions may be found, which may
not provide consistent values for the user rate of the non-
bottleneck areas and MNOs. When needed, they have been
computed in post-processing.
A. BS deployment simulation
A simulation environment was set up to derive the coalition
user rate per area ρas as a function of each possible number u
a
s
of BSs that coalition s can activate in area a, i.e., from 1 up
to Umax. In details, the entire set of Umax BSs is uniformly
distributed in a pseudo-random fashion on the considered
square areas; 10 sample users are also randomly distributed
over each area a. The downlink SINR of each sample user
in a for each coalition s (SINRas ) is calculated for each
possible value of uas as a function of: the signal power Pk
the sample user receives from its serving BS k (i.e., the BS
from which receives the strongest signal), the signal power∑
j 6=k Pj received from the interfering (non-serving) BSs and
the white Gaussian noise signal power8 Pnoise. Since users are
8The white Gaussian noise signal power accounts for the considered system
bandwidth.
characterized by an activity factor η, the captured interference
is scaled down by the load of coalition s in area a, i.e.,
las = 1 − (1 − η)
∑
i∈Osσai Na
uas . SINRas is therefore calculated
as follows:
SINRas =
Pk
las
(∑
j 6=k
Pj
)
+ Pnoise
, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (25)
The received signal power Prx[dBm] has been calculated
according to a three-parameter path loss model (transmitted
signal power Ptx, fixed path loss Cpl and path loss exponent
Γ) defined within the GreenTouch Consortium [35]:
Prx[dBm] = Ptx[dBm]− Cpl[dB]− 10Γlog(d[km]), (26)
where d is the sample user–BS distance. The calculated SINR
is finally mapped to LTE nominal rate (ρa,noms ) according to
a multilevel SINR–to–rate scheme [35]. A single value for
ρa,noms is obtained by averaging over the 10 sample users. An
additional averaging is obtained by applying 100 iterations
for each value of uas ; ρ
a
s is then calculated analytically as the
product ρa,noms (1−η)
∑
i∈s σiNa
uas , according to the definition in
Section III-A.
B. Instances
We consider three square dense areas (their size and number
of users are provided in Table III) and three MNOs (A, B and
C) which is quite reasonable for the Italian (also European)
telecom playground [16]. Assuming the dense urban areas
belong to the same city, we consider the same distribution
of users among MNOs in all of them. We report the results
obtained for two such user distributions: M1, MNOs have
equal market shares (σA = σB = σC = 1/3) and M2, for
which the market shares of A, B and C are 10%, 30% and
60%, respectively (σA = 0.1, σB = 0.3, σC = 0.6).
The values of the user’s willingness to pay for 1 Mbps
of service on a monthly basis δ were deduced from current
data tariff-plans applied by different Italian MNOs. We have
considered 100 values in the range [0.02, 2] e/Mbps which
were obtained discretizing the range uniformly with a 0.02
step.
The number of available sites for installing small cell BSs in
a given geographical area is finite and most likely different for
each area. We set Umax to 4000 for all the considered areas;
such number of BSs it at least one order of magnitude larger
than the minimum needed for coverage9 whereas deploying
more BSs would result in only a marginal increase of the
average user rate ρs for the considered instances (see Figure 3).
The investment lifetime period D is set to 120 months (see,
e.g., [28,30]) for all instances.
For the two user distributions we generate a scenario for
each value of δ, while the rest of parameters (O, A, Na, Aa,
g, Umax, η, D) are fixed to the values provided in Table I.
9If we consider small cells of 50 m range, the minimum number of small
cell BSs for coverage would be roughly 500 for the largest area (Z1).
7Area Number of users Size
Z1 N1 = 20000 A1 = 4 km2
Z2 N2 = 20000 A2 = 0.5 km2
Z3 N3 = 10000 A3 = 1 km2
TABLE III: Characteristics of the set of areas
V. RESULTS
In this section, we examine the impact of the user economic
standpoint (different values of δ) and of the user distribu-
tion among MNOs (σi) on the coalitional structures and the
level of investment first of the socially optimal configurations
(Subsection V-A) and then of the stable configurations (Sub-
section V-B). The two configurations are then compared in
Subsection V-C.
We recall that the user rate as a function of the number
of deployed BSs for the different sharing configurations was
obtained by means of simulation (Subsection IV-A) and that it
behaves nonlinearly in the number of BSs; to obtain a MILP
formulation of the problem, we have approximated the user
rate functions with piecewise linear ones (see Subsection III-A,
Appendix A). In order to account for the error introduced
by the approximation, we investigate multiple configurations
which perform very similarly. This allows us to identify
general trends concerning the size and composition of the
selected coalitional structures as we vary δ and the user
distribution. For each value of δ, we consider as socially
optimal sharing configurations the ones selected by the optimal
solution of problem (2)-(13), solved either under objective
TOTQ (14a) or MINQ (14b), and all configurations for
which the objective function value is at most 0.5% smaller
with respect to the optimal one. Similarly, for stable sharing
configurations, we relax the stability condition as follows: we
consider a configuration (s1, . . . , sp) to be stable if for any
j = 1, . . . , p there is no nonempty subset s′j ⊂ sj such that
pis′j
− pisj
pisj
> 0.5%, ∀ i ∈ s′j .
The different outcomes are denoted by the following notation:
ABC represents the grand coalition, coalitional structures that
consist of a singleton (i.e., a MNO investing alone) and a
coalition of two MNOs are denoted by A/BC, B/AC and
C/AB10, whereas the case when no sharing takes place, that
is, when each MNO invests by itself, is denoted by A/B/C.
For each possible outcome, we report the values of δ
for which the outcome is socially optimal under objectives
TOTQ and MINQ in Tables IV and V for user distributions
M1 and M2, respectively. The results concerning the stable
configurations are reported in Tables VIIIa and VIIIb for user
distributions M1 and M2, respectively.
Concerning the level of investment, we report the number of
BSs deployed by the sharing configurations only for a subset
of the considered values of δ (i.e., {0.02, 0.04, 0.2, 0.4, 1,
2}) due to space limitations. For all values of δ for which
we have identified multiple configurations (as illustrated in
Tables IV, V, VIIIa and VIIIb), we report the results of the
10We remark that outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are equivalent for user
distribution M1 since MNOs have equal market shares.
configuration selected by the optimal solution of the MILP
model for the socially optimal configurations in Tables VI and
VII, for user distributions M1 and M2, respectively. Similarly,
when multiple configurations are stable, only one of them
is reported in Tables IXa and IXb, for user distributions M1
and M2 respectively. The notation concerning the number of
deployed BSs in Tables VI, VII, IX is the following: for
outcome ABC, the reported number represents the number
of BSs deployed by the grand coalition, for outcomes A/BC,
C/AB and B/AC, the first number represents the number of
BSs deployed by the singleton whereas the second represents
the number of BSs deployed by the coalition of two, whereas
for outcome A/B/C, the number of BSs deployed by each
MNO are reported in order (i.e., the first number corresponds
to A, the second to B and third to C).
A. Socially optimal configurations
As a general rule, results show that as users are willing
to pay more (i.e., for higher values of δ) and, as a result,
MNOs can afford a larger network cost, the socially optimal
configurations consist of smaller and less congested coalitions
in order to provide the best service level. Regarding the level
of investment, the higher the value of δ, the denser the network
deployment as larger revenues make up for increasing network
cost.
Coalitional structure δ
ABC [0.02, 0.04]
A/BC, B/AC, C/AB [0.04, 0.1], [0.14, 2]
A/B/C [0.06, 2]
(a) TOTQ
Coalitional structure δ
ABC [0.02, 0.06]
A/BC, B/AC, C/AB 0.06, 0.1, [0.14, 0.22]
A/B/C [0.06, 2]
(b) MINQ
TABLE IV: Values of δ for which a coalitional structure is
socially optimal – user distribution M1
Coalitional structure δ
ABC [0.02, 0.06]
A/BC —
B/AC 0.04, 0.08, [0.12, 0.26]
C/AB [0.04, 2]
A/B/C [0.28, 2]
(a) TOTQ
Coalitional structure δ
ABC [0.02, 0.06], 0.1
A/BC —
B/AC [0.1, 0.16], [0.2, 2]
C/AB [0.06, 2]
A/B/C [0.26, 2]
(b) MINQ
TABLE V: Values of δ for which a coalitional structure is
socially optimal – user distribution M2
For very low and high values of δ, results are very similar
for both user distribution scenarios (M1 and M2). The grand
8coalition (ABC) outperforms the other configurations for δ =
0.02 for TOTQ and for δ ≤ 0.04 for MINQ for both M1 and
M2. Although ABC is selected also for few other low values
of δ for both objectives and user distributions, it performs
similarly to other outcomes (Tables IV and V): e.g., for M2,
ABC is selected by TOTQ also for δ = 0.06 but performs
similarly to C/AB. Instead, A/B/C, which represents the case
when no sharing takes place, is always among the selected
outcomes for δ ≥ 0.06 for both TOTQ and MINQ for M1
(Table IV) and for δ ≥ 0.28 for TOTQ and for δ ≥ 0.26 for
MINQ for M2 (Table V).
However, for intermediate values of δ, results seem more
sensitive to the user distribution. For M1, the equivalent
outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are selected for almost all
values of δ in [0.06, 2] for TOTQ and for some values of δ
in [0.06, 0.22] for MINQ (Table IV). However, since they
are always selected alongside A/B/C, that is, they perform
very similarly to the case when there is no sharing, there
is practically no incentive for sharing also for intermediate
values of δ for M1. Instead for M2, for δ in [0.08, 0.26],
the only socially optimal configurations selected by TOTQ
are C/AB and, for a subset of the values of δ in this range,
also B/AC (Table Va); similarly for MINQ for δ in [0.12,
0.24] (Table Vb). In C/AB and B/AC, both coalitions of two
MNOs, AB and AC, involve A which has the smallest market
share (10%) and therefore introduces the minimum level of
interference to a coalition. Moreover, for low values of δ, A
benefits from being in a coalition since it cannot afford to
invest sufficiently by itself given its small market share11. For
these values, C/AB is more persistent than B/AC (i.e., it is
selected for all δ in [0.04, 2] by TOTQ and all δ in [0.06,
2] by MINQ) since C and AB are smaller (less congested)
than AC. In turn A/BC, which involves the largest coalition of
two MNOs (BC) and the smallest MNO (A) investing alone,
is never selected.
Concerning the level of investment, in Tables VIa and VIb,
we report the number of small cell BSs deployed in each
area for the socially optimal sharing configuration selected by
the optimal solution under TOTQ and MINQ, respectively,
for a subset of the considered values of δ ({0.02, 0.04, 0.2,
0.4, 1, 2}) and user distribution M1. Results concerning user
distribution M2 are reported in Tables VIIa and VIIb.
For most instances, both objectives TOTQ and MINQ
provide the same coalitional structures but slightly different
number of deployed BSs. For instance, for user distribution M2
and δ = 0.02 (see Tables VIIa and VIIb), the grand coalition
deploys 5 more BSs under MINQ compared to TOTQ in
the largest area (Z1), 16 more in the most congested/dense
area (Z2), and 22 BSs less in area Z3 (smaller than Z1 and
less congested than Z2). Since the overall profit of each MNO
has to be non-negative, objective MINQ achieves fairness by
“redistributing” BSs across the areas so that the user rate of
the worst served ones (Z1 & Z2) is increased at the expense
11For instance, if all MNOs were to invest by themselves, for δ ≤ 0.26
users of MNO A would perceive the worst service level (user rate) due to
A’s low level of investment. Instead, for δ ≥ 0.28, as A is able to densify its
network, users of C perceive the lowest user rate since C is the largest/most
congested MNO.
of sacrificing the user rate of the better served one (Z3) (see
also Figure 2 and observation (iv) in Section V-D).
Similar observations can be made for both user distribution
scenarios concerning the impact of δ on the number of
deployed BSs (Tables VI–VII). A little incentive from users
(small δ) forces MNOs to deploy only a small number of
BSs in order to limit their cost and therefore guarantee an
overall positive profit. For example, for user distribution M2,
δ = 0.02, under objective TOTQ the grand coalition deploys
169 BSs in area Z1, 156 BSs in area Z2 and 110 BSs in area Z3
(Table VIIa). However, as users are willing to pay more (larger
values of δ), more BSs are deployed since higher revenues
compensate the costs of deploying more BSs. In particular, all
available sites per area (Umax) are used up in all the areas
for user distribution M1 under objective TOTQ when δ ≥ 0.4
(Tables VIa); instead, for M2, the Umax BSs are exhausted
only in areas Z1 and Z2 when δ ≥ 0.4 whereas in Z3 the rate
saturation is achieved by deploying less than Umax BSs when
δ ≥ 0.46 (Table VIIa).
A/δ 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.4 1 2
Z1 ABC ABC A/BC A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
157 443 1007/1928 1500/1500/1000 1500/1500/1000 1500/1500/1000
Z2 ABC ABC A/BC A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
161 448 1000/2000 1500/1500/1000 1500/1500/1000 1500/1500/1000
Z3 ABC ABC A/BC A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
115 274 706/1496 1500/1500/1000 1500/1500/1000 1500/1500/1000
(a) TOTQ
A/δ 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.4 1 2
Z1 ABC ABC A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
177 467 1091/1091/1091 1257/1486/1257 1257/1257/1257 1257/1257/1257
Z2 ABC ABC A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
164 462 1141/1141/1141 1333/1334/1333 1334/1333/1333 1334/1333/1333
Z3 ABC ABC A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
91 232 488/488/488 1080/2288/632 2288/633/633 2288/633/633
(b) MINQ
TABLE VI: Socially optimal coalitional structures and corre-
sponding number of activated BSs – user distribution M1
A/δ 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.4 1 2
Z1 ABC ABC C/AB A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
169 398 2000/1364 700/1300/2000 700/1300/2000 700/1300/2000
Z2 ABC ABC C/AB A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
156 472 1700/1200 617/1383/2000 700/1300/2000 700/1300/2000
Z3 ABC ABC C/AB A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
110 287 1200/716 395/1200/2000 554/1200/2000 554/1200/2000
(a) TOTQ
A/δ 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.4 1 2
Z1 ABC ABC C/AB A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
174 469 1776/1191 401/1031/2568 401/1031/2568 401/1031/2568
Z2 ABC ABC C/AB A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
172 459 2185/1472 381/1055/2564 381/1055/2564 381/1055/2564
Z3 ABC ABC C/AB A/B/C A/B/C A/B/C
88 230 925/595 309/480/2662 858/480/2662 309/1029/2662
(b) MINQ
TABLE VII: Socially optimal coalitional structures and corre-
sponding number of activated BSs – user distribution M2
B. Stable configurations
Also for stable configurations, the higher the value of δ, the
smaller and less congested are the selected coalitions. For low
values of δ, MNOs prefer to collaborate with a larger number
9of MNOs so as to minimize the network cost. Instead, for
higher δ, i.e., higher revenues per unit of service provided,
MNOs prefer to increase the service level, which in turn
requires building less congested networks, i.e., either shared
networks with fewer and smaller MNOs or individual ones.
Coalitional structure δ
ABC [0.02, 0.1], [0.16, 0.22], 0.28
A/BC, B/AC, C/AB [0.02, 0.52], 0.6, [0.98, 2]
(a) User distribution M1
Coalitional structure δ
ABC [0.02, 0.04], [0.1, 0.12], [0.18, 0.30]
A/BC 0.02, 0.06, [0.1, 0.14], [0.18, 0.36], [0.52, 0.54]
B/AC [0.02, 0.08], [0.12, 0.16], [0.22, 0.52], [0.6, 2]
C/AB [0.04, 0.06], [0.1, 2]
(b) User distribution M2
TABLE VIII: Values of δ for which a coalitional structure is
stable
For user distribution M1 (see Table VIIIa), when δ ≤ 0.52
there is always incentive for sharing, i.e., each MNO is better
off building a shared network with at least one other MNO than
investing alone. The grand coalition (ABC) is stable for all
values of δ in [0.02, 0.1] and a subset of values in [0.16, 0.28]
but it ceases to be the stable when δ ≥ 0.3. The equivalent
outcomes A/BC, B/AC and C/AB are stable for all δ in [0.02,
0.52] but they become unstable for a subset of values of δ in
[0.54, 2] which in turn means that in such cases no sharing will
take place and MNOs will build individual networks. However,
for δ ≥ 0.3, A/BC, B/AC and C/AB perform very similarly to
A/B/C.
For user distribution M2 (see Table VIIIb), as δ increases
only configurations containing the least congested coalitions
of two MNOs remain stable. The grand coalition (ABC)
and outcome A/BC (which involves the largest coalition of
two MNOs) are never stable for δ ≥ 0.32 and δ ≥ 0.56,
respectively. For δ ≥ 0.56, C/AB and, for a subset of values
of δ, also B/AC are stable. In particular, outcome C/AB, in
which the largest MNO C invests by itself whereas the smaller
MNOs A and B collaborate, is always stable for δ ≥ 0.1.
A/δ 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.4 1 2
Z1 ABC ABC ABC A/BC A/BC A/BC
67 157 443 349/686 606/1500 1000/2000
Z2 ABC ABC ABC A/BC A/BC A/BC
65 163 471 357/628 558/1500 1000/2000
Z3 ABC ABC ABC A/BC A/BC A/BC
54 54 272 178/274 298/678 490/1000
(a) User distribution M1
A/δ 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.4 1 2
Z1 ABC ABC ABC C/AB C/AB C/AB
74 169 700 700/491 1200/700 2000/1200
Z2 ABC ABC ABC C/AB C/AB C/AB
69 156 472 700/465 1200/700 1700/1200
Z3 ABC ABC ABC C/AB C/AB C/AB
12 66 287 273/237 700/476 700/700
(b) User distribution M2
TABLE IX: Stable coalitional structures and corresponding
number of activated BSs
Concerning the number of BSs deployed by the stable
configurations (Tables IX), a little incentive from users (small
δ) forces MNOs to activate only a small number of BSs in
order to limit their cost and therefore guarantee an overall
positive profit. For example, for user distribution M2 and
δ = 0.02, the grand coalition is stable and it activates 74
BSs in area Z1, 69 BSs in area Z2 and 12 BSs in area Z3
(Table IXb). However, as users are willing to pay more (larger
values of δ), more BSs are activated since higher revenues
compensate the costs of activating more BSs.
C. Comparison
We now compare the behavior of the socially optimal and
stable configurations. The impact of δ on the two config-
urations is overall very similar. However, there is incentive
for sharing for a larger range of the values of δ in order to
maximize the MNOs profits (i.e., for stable configurations)
compared to maximizing the global/minimum user rate (i.e.
for the socially optimal configurations). In other words, shared
networks can be more beneficial from the MNOs perspective
as sharing the network cost allows for larger profits but
less beneficial from the user perspective due to the service
level degradation experienced in more congested networks.
Consider for instance user distribution M1. The grand coalition
ABC is socially optimal for δ ∈ [0.02, 0.04] for TOTQ and
for δ ∈ [0.02, 0.06] for MINQ, but it is stable for a larger
number of values of δ between 0.02 and 0.28. In general,
under MINQ sharing is selected as optimal strategy only for
δ ≤ 0.22, while sharing configurations are stable for a wider
range of values (up to δ = 2), which means that for higher
values of δ no sharing should takes place in order to provide
the best service level, while there is incentive to share in order
to maximize the MNOs’ profit.
Regarding the level of investment, the higher the value of
δ, the denser the network deployment for both configurations
as larger revenues make up for increasing network cost.
Nevertheless, for the same value of δ more BSs are deployed
by the socially optimal configurations compared to the stable
ones, as the former focus on the user rate whereas the latter,
focusing on the profit, reflect the trade-off between increased
revenues and cost. For instance, for M1 and δ = 0.04, the
grand coalition is selected by TOTQ and it is stable; however,
it deploys 443 BSs in area Z1, 448 in Z2 and 274 in Z3 under
objective TOTQ (Tables VIa) whereas in order to maximize
the MNOs profit, 157 BSs are deployed in area Z1, 163 in Z2
and 54 in Z3 (Table IXa).
D. Performance indicators analysis
We now analyze how different values of δ impact two
key performance indicators for the users and the MNOs: the
average user rate, Qavg =
∑
i∈O,a∈A q
a
i
|O|×|A| , and the average
global profit, Pavg =
∑
i∈O
∑
a∈A(r
a
i −cai )
|O| ; when multiple
configurations are selected for the same value of δ (as reported
in Tables IV, V, VIII), we average also over the different con-
figurations. In particular, we analyze the “price” of imposing
a fair coalitional structure (objective MINQ).
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Results show that the socially optimal infrastructure sharing
configurations outperform stable ones in terms Qavg and vice
versa for Pavg . However, as users are willing to pay more, the
two configuration types tend to provide very similar values of
Qavg and Pavg .
As similar observations regarding the behavior of Qavg and
Pavg as a function of δ can be drawn for both user distributions
M1 and M2, we report results concerning only M2 in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Average user rate (Qavg) and average profit (Pavg) vs.
δ – user distribution M2
As pointed out in Section V-A, the socially optimal con-
figurations obtained applying objectives TOTQ and MINQ
are the same for most instances and they also provide very
similar Qavg (the largest difference across all values of δ
is approximately 1.1 Mbps) which can be observed by the
overlap of their corresponding plots (see Figure 1). Therefore,
solutions that are fair to all users in all the areas are also
efficient.
More BSs are activated by the socially optimal configu-
rations than by stable ones (see Subsection V-C) which is
reflected in their corresponding Qavg and Pavg . The difference
in the Qavg provided by the socially optimal configurations
and stable ones for δ = 0.02 is nearly 12.6 Mbps (45.8% gap);
it goes down to 4.3 Mbps (8.1%) for δ = 1 and eventually
becomes nearly 1.8 Mbps (3.3%) for δ = 2. Thus, for high
δ, the two types of configurations provide roughly the same
quality of service to the users if they are very interested in the
new service.
As far as Pavg is concerned, for low values of δ, the differ-
ence in the Pavg provided by the two types of configurations
is significantly different (see Figure 1). For δ = 0.02, the
configuration selected by TOTQ provides on the average only
55.2 e per MNO, whereas the stable configurations provide
262306.3 e . This suggests that solutions obtained from ob-
jectives TOTQ and MINQ merely satisfy the constraint on
having a positive profit while providing, on the average, a
12.6 Mbps higher user rate. However, with the increase of δ,
the difference in rate between the two types of configurations
becomes negligible, and so does the difference in profit (only
2.8% for δ = 2).
So far we have investigated the average performance indi-
cators (Qavg and Pavg). We now analyze how the user rate
per area and MNO (Q) and profit per area and MNO (P ) are
affected by the characteristics of MNOs (market share) and by
the characteristics of the areas (size and population, reported
in Table III) for both configurations.
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Fig. 2: User rate (Q) vs. profit (P ) for each area and MNO –
user distribution M2, δ = 0.02.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of Q with respect to P in
each area, for each MNO for the user distribution M2 when
δ = 0.02. We recall that, when δ = 0.02, the grand coalition
(ABC) is socially optimal (for both TOTQ and MINQ
objectives) and stable. For this scenario we can observe that:
(i) the socially optimal configurations provide in every area
higher user rates than the stable one, which in turn guarantee
higher revenues, (ii) the grand coalition results in all MNOs
providing the same user rate to users of the same area, while
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their profit follows their market shares (see Equations (12),
(24)), (iii) in area Z3, MNOs obtain a negative profit under
objective TOTQ, while the global profit for each MNO is
positive, which indicates that a negative balance between costs
and revenues can be accepted in some areas by the socially
optimal configurations, (iv) the objective that favors fairness
(MINQ) improves the quality of service of the users of the
largest area (Z1) and most congested area (Z2) at the cost of
lowering the user rate of area Z3 and (v) since the user rate
provided by a given coalitional structure in an area depends
on the user density, on the size of the area and on the number
of BSs activated in that area, a slightly higher user rate is
achieved for the small, low user density area (Z3) by the
socially optimal configurations as the LTE nominal rate is
divided among less users and on the average users are closer
to their serving BSs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work analyzes the strategic situation in which MNOs
have to decide whether to invest in LTE small cells in dense
urban areas and whether to share the investment with other
MNOs. A mathematical framework is proposed to address the
problem of infrastructure sharing for the considered scenario.
This framework accounts for techno-economic parameters
such as the achievable throughput and a general pricing model
for the LTE service. The problem has been tackled from two
perspectives: the one of a regulatory entity which imposes
infrastructure sharing configurations that optimize the quality
of service perceived by all users and the MNOs perspective,
which captures their competitive and profit-maximizing nature.
We propose an MILP formulation to determine socially opti-
mal configurations (regulator perspective) and adopt concepts
of cooperative game theory to determine stable configurations
(MNOs perspective).
Results show that sharing configurations obtained under
both perspectives are strongly affected by how much users
are willing to pay for the new services but they also depend
on the user distribution (MNOs market shares). Sharing is
appealing from both perspectives when users are willing to
pay little, regardless of the MNOs market shares as they all
struggle with high infrastructure cost. Instead, if users were
willing to pay more, there is generally more incentive to share
from the MNO perspective and in particular when MNOs have
significantly different market shares. For both perspectives, the
selected configurations involve less congested coalitions, that
is, coalitions of fewer and smaller MNOs, when the market
shares are significantly different. When the focus is on the
quality of service, such configurations behave very similarly
to the case when no sharing takes place, that is, users are best
served either by less congested coalitions or when all MNOs
build individual networks.
The proposed mathematical framework has proved to be
a flexible instrument of limited complexity to analyze in
detail the possible strategies for different infrastructure sharing
configurations under different techno-economic conditions. It
can be further extended to incorporate spectrum management
issues and therefore more elaborated game theory models, as
well as different classes of users and heterogeneous technolo-
gies.
APPENDIX A
We recall that the nominal user rate (ρa,noms ) is computed
by means of the simulation described in Subsection IV-A
whereas the average user rate (ρas ) is derived from ρ
a,nom
s
according to Equations (27). ρas is then approximated by a
concave piecewise linear function in order to formulate the
problem as a MILP.
ρas = ρ
a,nom
s (1− η)
∑
i∈Os σiNa
uas , ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (27)
Figure 3 illustrates the simulated nominal user rate ρa,noms ,
the average user rate ρas and the piece-wise linear function
approximating ρas for coalition ABC in area Z1 (similarly for
all the other considered areas and coalitions). In the following,
we explain how the approximation was modeled in the MILP
formulation.
U0
s
Ul-1
s
Ul
s
U
max
Nr of BSs
R0
s
Rl-1
s
Rl
s
Rmax
s
R
at
e 
[M
bp
s]
ρ
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s
ρ
s
Adaptive piece-wise linear approximation of ρ
s
α
l
s
Fig. 3: Simulated nominal user rate (ρa,noms ), average user rate (ρas )
and adaptive piece-wise linearization for coalition ABC in area Z1
(20000 users, 4 km2).
As mentioned, L denotes the number of linear pieces
(intervals) that approximate ρas . We have considered equal
values of L for all the coalitions s ∈ S and all the areas
a ∈ A. L was set to 11 for user distribution M1 and to 10
for M2. For each interval l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, coalition s and area
a, [Ua,l−1s , U
a,l
s ] represents the range of the number of BSs
that characterize the lth interval, Ra,ls is the average user rate
when s activates Ua,ls BSs in a and α
a,l
s is the slope associated
with the lth interval. The average user rate ρas obtained by
activating uas BSs, with u
a
s ∈ [Ua,l−1s , Ua,ls ], is therefore equal
to Ra,l−1s +α
a,l
s (u
a
s−Ua,l−1s ). Equations (28) show how these
parameters are related with one another.
Ra,0s = ρ
a
s(1), ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A,
Ra,ls = R
a,l−1
s + α
a,l
s (U
a,l
s − Ua,l−1s ),
∀s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
(28)
In particular, Ua,0s is equal to 1, whereas U
a,L
s is equal to
Umax, ∀s ∈ S and ∀a ∈ A. Thus, the average user rate ρas
obtained by activating uas BSs can be reformulated as:
ρas = minl∈{0,...,L−1}{Ra,ls + αa,l+1s (uas − Ua,ls )},
∀ s ∈ S, ∀ a ∈ A. (29)
As ρas is maximized by any of the considered objective
functions, Equations (29) can be replaced by Constraints (8).
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Notice that, the auxiliary binary variables zas equal zero when
either no BSs are activated by s in a (uas = 0 and therefore
zas = 0 due to Constraint (7)) or s is not active (ys = 0 and
therefore zas = 0,∀a ∈ A due to Constraints (4) and (7)). In
turn, when zas = 0, we should also have ρ
a
s = 0, which is
guaranteed by Constraints (9) while Constraints (8) are made
redundant by the term M(1− zas ), where M = 1000.
APPENDIX B
The optimization problem with objective MINQ and Con-
straints (2)–(13) will be denoted by Infrastructure Sharing
Problem (ISP).
Theorem. The decision version of (ISP) is NP-complete.
Proof. The decision version of (ISP) can be formulated as:
Given a threshold Q¯ > 0 on the quality, are there variables
ys, zas , u
a
s and ρ
a
s , with s ∈ S and a ∈ A, such that Constraints
(2)–(13) are satisfied and MINQ ≥ Q¯?
We will prove that the decision version of (ISP) is NP-
complete by reduction from the Set Partitioning Problem
(SPP) which is a well-known NP-complete problem (see,
e.g., [36]). We recall the decision version of (SPP):
Given a universe U , a family C of subsets of U and a positive
integer K, is there a subset C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ K and
each element of the universe U belongs to exactly one member
of C′?
The proof is carried out in 3 steps.
1) The decision version of (ISP) is a NP problem because
verifying that a given solution is a YES one requires
O(|O|+ L|S|) number of operations.
2) It is possible to make a polynomial time transformation
of any instance ISPP of the decision version of (SPP)
into an instance IISP of the decision version of (ISP).
Given ISPP=(U , C, K), we build IISP=(O, S, A, Na,
{σi}i∈O, Umax, L, {U ls}Ll=0, {Rls}Ll=0, {αls}Ll=1, δ, D,
g, Q¯) as follows:
• O = U , S = C, |A| = 1, Na = |U|, σi = 1/|U| for
any i ∈ O, Umax = K, L = K − 1.
• For any coalition s ∈ S , we set U0s = 1, U1s =
2, . . . , UK−1s = K.
• Given an arbitrary coalition s ∈ S, we set:
R0s = |s|/|s| for any s ∈ S,
Rls = R
l−1
s + α
l
s for any s ∈ S and l =
1, . . . ,K − 1,
• For any coalition s ∈ S, we set R0s > α1s > α2s >
· · · > αK−1s > 0.
• δ = 1, D = 1, g = |s|, Q¯ = min
s∈S
R0s .
It is clear that such transformation can be done in
polynomial time with respect to size of IISP .
3) IISP is a YES instance if and only if ISPP is a YES
instance.
First, we prove the if part. Since ISPP is a YES
instance, there is a subset C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ K
and each element of the universe U belongs to exactly
one member of C′. We define the variables
ys = z
a
s = u
a
s =
{
1 if s ∈ C′,
0 otherwise, ρ
a
s =
{
R0s if s ∈ C′,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to check that Constraints (2)–(5) are satisfied.
Constraint (6) is fulfilled since∑
s∈S
uas = |C′| ≤ K = Umax.
The values of variables zas , u
a
s and ρ
a
s guarantee that
Constraints (7)–(9) hold. Furthermore, Constraints (13)
on the nonnegative profit of MNOs hold because∑
a∈A
(rai − cai ) =δDσiNaqai −
∑
s∈Si
g
σi∑
j∈s σj
uas =
∑
s∈Si
R0su
a
s −
∑
s∈Si
|s|
|s|u
a
s = 0.
Finally, since C′ is a partition of O, any MNO i belongs
to a unique coalition si ∈ C′ and qai = ρasi = R0si ≥ Q¯
for any i ∈ O, that is MINQ ≥ Q¯. Therefore, IISP is
a YES instance.
Now, we prove the only if part. Assume that IISP is
a YES instance, i.e., there are variables ys, zas , u
a
s and
ρas , with s ∈ S and a ∈ A, such that all the Constraints
(2)–(13) are satisfied and MINQ ≥ Q¯. For any i ∈ O
we have qai ≥ Q¯ > 0, hence we get from Constraints
(4), (7) and (9) that for any i ∈ O there exists a unique
coalition si ∈ Si such that ysi = 1. Thus, uasi ≥ 1 by
Constraint (5). On the other hand, rai = δDσiNaq
a
i =
ρasi and
cai =
∑
s∈Si
g
σi∑
j∈s σj
uas = g
σi∑
j∈si σj
uasi =
|s|
|si|u
a
si = R
0
siu
a
si .
Since 0 ≤ rai − cai = ρasi − R0siuasi , we obtain from
Figure 4 that uasi ≤ 1. Thus, for any activated coalition
s (i.e., ys = 1) the number of deployed BSs is uas = 1.
If we define
C′ = {s ∈ S : ys = 1},
then C′ is a partition of U and |C′| = ∑s∈S uas ≤
Umax = K, therefore ISPP is a YES instance.
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Fig. 4: Graphical illustration of the number of BSs activated
by coalitions.
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